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INTRODUCTION
On June 20, 1939, Adolf Hitler called upon Hans Posse, one of his 
chief advisors, to establish the Sonderauftrag Linz (“Special Project 
Linz”)—a cultural complex in the Führer’s hometown.  The show-
piece of the propagandistic cultural center would be the Führermu-
seum, a grand museum housing the most revered European artwork 
from every century.1  By the end of the war, the Nazis had stolen more 
than 21,000 paintings, sculptures, and other art pieces for Hitler’s 
museum.2  Upon discovering the large-scale pillaging when the war 
ended,3 the Allies mounted a well-publicized campaign to return the 
stolen art to its rightful owners.4  For essentially the first time in his-
tory, the international art community launched a coordinated cam-
paign to repatriate stolen art and revise museum acquisition policies.  
Beyond returning many of the stolen works, the postwar movement 
1 See FREDERIC SPOTTS, HITLER AND THE POWER OF AESTHETICS 187-88 (2003); Wil-
liam J. Diebold, The Politics of Derestoration:  The Aegina Pediments and the German Confron-
tation with the Past, ART J., Summer 1995, at 60, 62-63 (describing Hitler’s plan for 
transforming Munich into a Nazi cultural center that would utilize many classical and 
neoclassical themes); see also JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD 
REICH, 185-86 (1996) (describing the importance of acquiring stolen art to Hitler’s 
collection for the Führermuseum). 
2 Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed 
Conflict, 42 A.F. L. REV. 277, 288 n.49 (1997).  For a helpful overview of Hitler’s art pol-
icy and pillaging, see generally LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF 
EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).  For 
an account of Hitler’s art collection after the war, see Gladys E. Hamlin, European Art 
Collections and the War:  Part II, 4 C. ART J. 209, 210 (1945), noting that “records found 
at Neu-Schwanstein . . . show[ed] that twenty-one thousand works of art . . . had passed 
through the castle.” 
3 See Hamlin, supra note 2, at 209-10 (detailing the efforts led by the American 
Seventh Army to locate Hitler’s collection of stolen art at Neuschwanstein castle). 
4 The United States created the Commission for the Protection and Salvaging of 
the Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe—a group tasked with returning art sto-
len by the Nazis to its original owners.  See Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 288 n.49. 
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resulted in the 1954 Hague Convention, which conceived the art 
world’s newest buzzword:  “cultural property.”5
Nearly two centuries before Hitler’s art campaign, revolutionary 
and postrevolutionary French governments, particularly under Napo-
leon Bonaparte, oversaw many national political changes that impli-
cated concepts of cultural property.  Chief among these was the na-
tionalization of the royal art collection at the Luxembourg Palace, 
later renamed the Musée Napoléon (and now known as the Louvre).6
Like Hitler, Napoleon envisioned a spectacular art museum bearing 
his name and charged French troops with confiscating art at home 
and in foreign conquests.7  Between 1794 and 1813, art shipments ar-
rived in France nearly every year from Italy, Belgium, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Spain.8  When the Musée Napoléon became too 
cramped with the spoils of war, Napoleon transferred art to regional 
museums throughout the country.9  Although the 1815 Treaty of Paris 
ended the war in Europe, most works stolen by the Napoleonic armies 
remain in the Louvre or in French regional museums today.10
Art and cultural-heritage law has matured considerably in the last 
century, particularly in the wake of the Nazi art-looting operation.  
The concept of cultural property seems all encompassing, and the art-
law community is consumed by the goals of repatriation and restitu-
tion.  Despite this intense focus on preserving cultural heritage, cur-
rent private and public legal regimes prevent most repatriation claims 
for art stolen before the twentieth century, and the world’s museums 
are not receptive to centuries-removed restitution claims.  However, 
5 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 36 Stat. 2279, 249 U.N.T.S. 215; see also Naomi Mezey, 
Essay, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2009 (2007) (track-
ing the emergence of cultural-property law after World War II). 
6 For an overview of the transformation of the Luxembourg Palace from the royal 
collections to the modern Louvre, see ANDREW MCCLELLAN, INVENTING THE LOUVRE
(1994).
7 See id. at 115-18 (outlining Napoleon’s concept for a glorious cultural center in 
Paris capped by the Musée Napoléon). 
8 CECIL GOULD, TROPHY OF CONQUEST: THE MUSÉE NAPOLÉON AND THE CREA-
TION OF THE LOUVRE 77-79, 129 (1965); MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 114-19, 131, 198. 
9 See GOULD, supra note 8, at 70-77; see also Edouard Pommier, La création des 
musées de province:  Les ratures de l’arrêté de l’an IX, 39 LA REVUE DU LOUVRE ET DES 
MUSÉES DE FRANCE 328, 332 (1989) (describing the growing political pressure for Paris 
to share works with the regional museums). 
10 See, e.g., GOULD, supra note 8, at 125-28 (discussing the number of works re-
maining in France after postrevolutionary restitution, including about half of the Ital-
ian works and most of the Flemish works). 
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much of the stolen cultural property in today’s museums and private 
collections was, like the artwork taken by Napoleon’s armies, stolen 
during the wars, revolutions, and colonial occupations of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This Comment explores the current legal paradox that allows for 
the repatriation of art taken during World War II while maintaining 
stolen Flemish art in the Louvre for eternity.  Part I discusses the Na-
poleonic revolution and the creation of French museums relying on 
stolen European masterpieces for their collections.  Even though the 
Second Treaty of Paris required some restitution of Italian and Aus-
trian art, Flemish art taken by French troops remained in France even 
after peace was declared.  Part II analyzes the development of the law 
of restitution from Roman prize law through World War II and pre-
sents examples of how nations today attempt formal and informal re-
patriation claims.  Part III presents an argument for why France 
should return Flemish art to Belgium and describes what legal routes 
Belgium might take to retrieve its works of art. 
The presence of Flemish art in French museums mimics other 
situations in which cultural objects were taken from their country of 
origin.  Restitution claims invariably involve a struggle between na-
tionalistic patriotism and our broader aspiration for international ap-
preciation of other cultural traditions.  Recognizing the perplexing 
boundaries of the seemingly broad world of repatriation claims, this 
Comment offers a replicable private-sector solution based on the ac-
cord between Italy and the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the Met)11
that balances repatriation and the art community’s desire for public 
access to the world’s art. 
I. THE NAPOLEONIC REVOLUTION AND
 THE CREATION OF FRANCE’S MUSEUMS
Throughout the eighteenth century, French nobility and intellec-
tuals made great strides toward improving public access to the arts.12
Semipublic display and appreciation of art took root in France before 
11 See infra Part II.B.2. 
12 These improvements were mostly the result of a royal command to rid artists of 
guild restrictions, which in turn allowed for the salon culture in Paris under the Royal 
Academy.  As early as the fourteenth century, artists under royal protection were able 
to take commissions, hold improved legal status, and enjoy free studios and incredible 
architectural display space at the Louvre.  As artists moved under the protection of the 
nation, the Academy was able to organize the best work in the salons.  See THOMAS E.
CROW, PAINTERS AND PUBLIC LIFE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PARIS 23-25, 33-34 (1985). 
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the Revolution through the royally sanctioned seventeenth-century 
exhibits held occasionally by the Royal Academy.13  In 1737, the first 
regular public exhibitions began at the Salon Carré in the Louvre.14
Enthusiasm for art exhibitions amplified, and by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the salon model and the public agenda of educat-
ing buyers and artists consumed Paris and spread to the provinces.15
Many of the French regional museums had their roots before the 
Revolution as local art schools16 or as meeting places for art connois-
seurs17 in this age of enlightenment. 
In 1750, the French monarchy responded to public pressure by 
opening its collection at the Luxembourg Palace as a spectacle of 
royal magnificence.18  As public exhibitions became more popular, 
more opportunities emerged for both royal and political leaders to 
use art as propaganda.19  At the end of the century, France was cultur-
ally and politically ripe for revolution.  Napoleon would, like previous 
French governments, take advantage of the public’s desire for art and 
the potential propagandistic use of cultural property to meet his po-
litical goals. 
A.  Napoleon and the Confiscation of Art at Home and Abroad 
Following his rise to political control of France in 1799, Napoleon 
charged his Minister of the Interior, Jean-Antoine Chaptal, with estab-
lishing French economic and cultural superiority in Europe.20  In par-
ticular, the Napoleonic regime believed that filling French regional 
13 Id. at 33-39. 
14 Id. at 1. 
15 See generally DANIEL J. SHERMAN, WORTHY MONUMENTS: ART MUSEUMS AND THE 
POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 97-98 (1989) (noting the en-
thusiasm for the arts throughout France in the decades leading up to the Revolution). 
16 See, e.g., id. at 97 (describing the origins of the museum in Bordeaux as a re-
gional teaching institution).  The museum in Dijon was an art school and library until 
the local government converted the school into a rudimentary museum at the Estates 
of Burgundy.  See generally PIERRE GEORGEL, LE MUSÉE DES BEAUX-ARTS DE DIJON
(1985); PIERRE QUARRÉ, LE MUSÉE DE DIJON 1 (2d ed. 1966). 
17 See, e.g., Michel Hilaire, Introduction to QUENTIN BUVELOT ET AL., TABLEAUX 
FLAMANDS ET HOLLANDAIS DU MUSÉE FABRE DE MONTPELLIER, at vii-viii (1998) (ex-
plaining the founding of a museum at Montpellier by a group of “bourgeois notables,” 
amateur connoisseurs, and collectors who hoped to educate themselves about art). 
18 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 13. 
19 See id. at 13-14. 
20 See generally Jeff Horn & Margaret C. Jacob, Jean-Antoine Chaptal and the Cultural 
Roots of French Industrialization, 39 TECH. & CULTURE 671, 672 (1998) (outlining Chap-
tal’s economic goals during the revolutionary period). 
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museums with exquisite art and creating the Musée Napoléon in Paris 
would make France the cultural center of the Western world.21  In or-
der to meet this goal, the government first looked to artwork owned 
by the French people.  It nationalized the royal art collection at the 
Luxembourg Palace and all Church property in France, and later con-
fiscated assets belonging to émigrés.22  Most of this art journeyed di-
rectly to regional cities, with local museums acting as “art depots” for 
the works seized from churches, abbeys, and the homes of royalty.23
To complement and expand upon local collections, French ar-
mies confiscated select European masterpieces from foreign aristo-
crats, religious buildings, and museums.24  In September 1794, the 
first stolen Belgian artwork arrived at the Musée Napoléon.25  Over the 
course of France’s foreign conquests, French armies would loot many 
of Belgium’s largest churches and cathedrals and return with some of 
the most prized Flemish “old master” paintings.26  Many in France 
21 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 91-123. 
22 See SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 99 (recounting the revolutionary government’s 
actions nationalizing church property in 1789, and, in the following three years, cen-
soring religious associations and confiscating foreigners’ property). 
23 See, e.g., Blandine Chavanne, De la collection au musée, l’exemple nancéien, in DE
L’AN II AU SACRE DE NAPOLÉON: LE PREMIER MUSÉE DE NANCY 12-13 (Blandine Cha-
vanne & Clara Gelly-Saldia eds., 2001) (describing the transfer of confiscated art to a 
local painting school to create the musée des Beaux-Arts de Nancy in 1793); Marc Fu-
maroli, The Birth of the Modern Museum, in MASTERWORKS FROM THE MUSÉE DES BEAUX-
ARTS, LILLE 1, 5-8 ( John P. O’Neill ed., 1992) (providing an account of the transfer of 
Peter Paul Rubens’s Descent from the Cross from a local Capuchin convent to the local 
museum at Lille). 
24 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 116-18 (detailing Napoleon’s confiscations dur-
ing his campaigns in Italy). 
25 See id. at 114-15 (describing the start of organized confiscations in Belgium and 
the arrival of the first shipment of Belgian art in September 1794). 
26 See Abbé Grégoire, Rapport sur les destructions opérées par le vandalisme, et sur les mo-
yens de le réprimer, in DÉCRET DE LA CONVENTION NATIONALE 22 (1794) (noting that 
France had acquired works by Crayer, Van Dyck, Rubens, and other Flemish masters to 
adorn the walls of French museums).  Works by Rubens, David, and many other Flem-
ish masters permeate French museum collections.  See, e.g., 3 L’ASSOCIATION DES 
CONSERVATEURS DE LA REGION NORD—PAS-DE-CALAIS, TRESORS DES MUSEES DU NORD 
DE LA FRANCE:  LA PEINTURE FLAMANDE AU TEMPS DE RUBENS (1977) (reciting Des-
camps’ 1769 description of The Ecstasy of Mary Magdalene taken from a Franciscan 
Church in Ghent and displayed at the Musée des Beaux-Arts in Lille); JOHN DENISON 
CHAMPLIN, JR. & CHARLES C. PERKINS, 4 CYCLOPEDIA OF PAINTERS AND PAINTINGS 378 
(1887) (stating that The Coronation of the Virgin was taken from the Church of the Rec-
ollets in Antwerp); OLGA POPOVITCH, CATALOGUE DES PEINTURES DU MUSÉE DES 
BEAUX-ARTS DE ROUEN 35 (1978) (commenting that Gerard David’s Virgin and Saints
was stolen from the Sion Carmelites Convent in Bruges and is now at the museum in 
Rouen); Musée des Augustins Database, Le Christ entre les deux larrons,
http://www.augustins.org/en/collections/bdd/fiche.asp?num=D+1805+6. 
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viewed these actions not as looting, but as the restoration of the mas-
terpieces to their rightful place in Europe’s new, glorious cultural cen-
ter—France.27
On August 31, 1801, Chaptal issued the Decree of 13 Fructidor 
year IX (the so-called “Chaptal Decree”), which institutionalized and 
coordinated local and national art-confiscation efforts.28  The Decree 
provided for the distribution of batches of stolen artwork among the 
Louvre (then the Musée Napoléon) in Paris and fifteen regional cit-
ies.29  Successive waves of artwork, carefully sorted in order to ensure 
that the French people would be able to view the very best art from 
around Europe, made their way across France in 1801, 1802, 1805, and 
1811, and on to the walls of public museums.30  In a report describing 
the Decree, Chaptal explained his initiative as an attempt to create 
bountiful public art collections featuring “une suite intérressante de 
tableaux de tous les maîtres, de tous les genres, de toutes les écoles.”31
The fulfillment of the Chaptal Decree communicated a new sense 
of political legitimacy to French citizens.  By creating a museum system 
filled with confiscated masterpieces, Napoleon showed the affluence of 
French culture in his nouveau regime.  He further demonstrated the 
strength of French armies, which conquered both foreign nations and 
their art.  French subjects in the provinces had fine art at their finger-
tips because of the policies of their new government and leader. 
B. The Second Treaty of Paris 
When England and its allies defeated Napoleon in 1814, Belgium 
had been stripped of its artistic treasures, but the walls of French mu-
seums remained covered with stolen Belgian artwork.  Concerned by 
en/collections/bdd/fiche.asp?num=D+1805+6 (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (noting that 
Christ Between Two Criminals was taken from a church in Antwerp and is now displayed 
at the museum in Toulouse); see also MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 111 (noting the 
transportation of Ruben’s Descent from the Cross from Antwerp to the Louvre). 
27 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 115-18 (excerpting parts of speeches by Napo-
leon’s contemporaries expressing the view that artwork stolen from around Europe 
belonged in France). 
28 See GOULD, supra note 8, at 75-77, 77 n.1 (presenting the September 1, 1800, 
Chaptal Decree and noting some confusion as to the date of the Decree); see also
Edouard Pommier, Idéologie et musée à l’époque révolutionnaire, in LES IMAGES DE LA RÉVO-
LUTION FRANÇAISE 57 (Michel Vovelle ed., 1988). 
29 See GOULD, supra note 8, at 76-77. 
30 See Chavanne, supra note 23, at 12-13. 
31 Id. at 12 (quoting Chaptal’s desire to amass “an interesting collection of works 
of all masters, from all genres and from all schools of art”). 
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this situation, the victorious British general, the Duke of Wellington, 
and Viscount Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, hoped to lay plans 
for art restoration.  In correspondences written by Wellington and 
Castlereagh, the two men commented that the works in the Louvre 
and other French museums were effectively military trophies and that 
France should be required to return the art.32  Castlereagh believed 
that contemporary principles of property and military law required 
France to return art to the museums, homes, and churches from 
which they were stolen.33
The preliminary 1814 Convention and Treaty of Paris did not pro-
vide any guidelines for the return of stolen art.34  Therefore, when 
representatives of the British, Dutch, Prussian, and Russian vanquish-
ers arrived in Paris to discuss a long-term peace treaty with France, the 
stolen art was a major topic.  Although the French lobbied for a spe-
cial convention protecting the art, the victors summarily rejected this 
proposal because it conflicted with the common law that existed at the 
time.35  The Second Treaty of Paris, signed on November 20, 1815, 
forced France to return territories that it acquired in the war.36
France was also pressured to restore to its owners any art taken by 
French troops as spoils of war.37
32 See Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, 
and Russia (Sept. 1815), reprinted in 3 B.S.P. 203, 206 (“Can the King [of France] feel 
his own dignity exalted, or his title improved, in being surrounded by Monuments of 
Art, which record not less the sufferings of his own illustrious house, than of the sev-
eral Nations of Europe?”); Letter from Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh 
(Sept. 23, 1815), reprinted in 3 B.S.P. 207, 210 (arguing that the works were “obtained 
by military successes, of which they are the trophies” and therefore should be returned 
to the now-victorious Allies). 
33 See Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to Plenipotentiaries, supra note 32, reprinted 
in 3 B.S.P. 207, 207 (“The principle of property, regulated by the claims of the Territo-
ries from whence these Works were taken, is the surest and only guide to justice . . . .”). 
34 See Letter from Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh, supra note 32, re-
printed in 3 B.S.P. 207, 209 (noting “the silence of the Treaty of Paris of May, 1914, re-
garding the M[u]seum”). 
35 Id., reprinted in 3 B.S.P. 207, 209-10 (stating that the rejection of the French pro-
posal weakened the claim for possession of the art by the French). 
36 See Definitive Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, and 
France, Nov. 20, 1815, 3 B.S.P. 280, 284 [hereinafter Second Treaty of Paris] (stating 
that, with some exceptions, “[t]he Frontiers of France shall be the same as they were in 
the Year 1790”).  See generally ALISTAIR HORNE, LA BELLE FRANCE: A SHORT HISTORY
238-39 (2005) (chronicling the end of the Napoleonic Age). 
37 See John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the Repatriation 
Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 20 
(2004); Kastenberg, supra note 2, at 284; David Keane, The Failure to Protect Cultural 
Property in Wartime, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2004); see also TIM
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The Second Treaty of Paris did not lay out the specific method by 
which restitution should take place.  Legal practice at the time, how-
ever, maintained two requirements for restitution:  (1) proper identi-
fication, so that the Allies could only take art actually looted by Napo-
leon’s armies, and (2) territorial return, by which objects are returned 
to the nation from which they were taken despite territorial changes 
after the war.38  This practice caused many problems for countries 
hoping to claim stolen art.  The territoriality requirement led to par-
ticularly confusing results because of territorial changes in Europe af-
ter the war.  For example, the French returned the Heidelberg manu-
scripts to Heidelberg (the city from which the Vatican had taken the 
manuscripts 200 years earlier) in 1815, even though the French had 
found the manuscripts in the Vatican.39  For the same reason, a few 
Flemish paintings that had been housed in the Louvre were returned 
to the King of the Netherlands, rather than the new Belgian state.40
The Second Treaty of Paris was an important landmark in the de-
velopment of cultural-heritage law.  For the first time, a major art-
restitution project was justified by the significance of national cultural 
property.  The rise of the democratic nation-state after the French 
Revolution undoubtedly justified the concept of cultural heritage.41
Although the legal principles surrounding modern cultural-property 
law would not solidify until 1954, the Second Treaty of Paris laid the 
groundwork for the later repatriation model.  Nevertheless, the Treaty 
was wrought with political and practical problems.  Indeed, “diplo-
macy, bureaucratic obstruction, and the inability of weak nations to 
reclaim what was theirs” permanently stalled restitution.42  Almost half 
CHAPMAN, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 55 (1998); CHARLES GRANT ROBERTSON, ENG-
LAND UNDER THE HANOVERIANS 472 (1930); WILLIAM SIMPSON & MARTIN JONES,
EUROPE, 1783–1914, at 87 (2000); H. MORSE STEPHENS, REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE,
1789–1815, at 354 (1907). 
38 These requirements are discussed in WOJCIECH A. KOWALSKI, ART TREASURES 
AND WAR 27-28 (Tim Schadla-Hall ed., 1998). 
39 Tim Schadla-Hall, Foreword to KOWALSKI, supra note 38, at ix, xii (highlighting 
the “long-lived nature of restitution cases”). 
40 JEANETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 390 (3d ed. 
2007) (describing the bizarre consequences of the territoriality requirement for the 
works of art taken from new nations). 
41 See KOWALSKI, supra note 38, at 22-23 (noting the political rise of the nation-
state as an important catalyst for the concept of cultural property). 
42 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 6, at 200 (describing the French retention of art de-
spite the Duke of Wellington’s desire to repatriate the works). 
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of what had been taken by French armies remained in the Louvre and 
French regional museums.43
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
The repatriation policy enunciated in the Second Treaty of Paris 
and any possible Belgian claim for Flemish work in French museums 
today are best understood by considering the development of cultural-
property law and the law of restitution.  The law protecting cultural 
property in armed conflict has evolved considerably since its origins in 
ancient Rome.44  By and large, repatriation laws closely track changes 
in legal and political theory.  During the era of the powerful nation 
state, repatriation laws focused on the cultural property of individual 
nations; however, through the rise of globalization, more museums 
and art-law scholars now advocate a universal view of cultural property. 
This Part explores the development of the law of restitution from 
ancient times through the doctrines of cultural property and heritage.  
Part II.A sets out the current legal and theoretical guidelines for ana-
lyzing a restitution claim based on the historical evolution of restitu-
tion law.  Part II.B presents two comparative examples of repatriation 
demands.  In particular, this Part shows why some demands fail, such 
as Greece’s claim for the Elgin Marbles, while other similar claims suc-
ceed, as most notably shown by the agreement between Italy and the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art for the return of the Euphronios Krater.  
By considering the underlying principles for successful repatriation, we 
can use comparative examples to increase our understanding of how a 
hypothetical Belgian action against France might proceed. 
A.  Looting and War:  From Prize Law to Nationalism  
and Cultural-Property Internationalism 
Looting and war have been natural partners for centuries.  From 
the earliest conflicts, victors have taken the spoils of war in the form of 
43 Id.; see also Ferdinand Boyer, Le musée du Louvre après les restitutions d’oeuvres d’art 
de l’étranger et les musées des départements (1816), in BULLITEN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DE 
L’HISTORIE DE L’ART FRANÇAIS, 79, 80-83 (1969) (cataloging various works retained by 
the French); John Henry Merryman, Introduction to IMPERIALISM, ART AND RESTITU-
TION 1, 1 (John Henry Merryman ed., 2006) (“The Louvre and other French museums 
are filled with paintings and sculptures ‘acquired’ by Napoleon’s forces during his 
Northern and Italian campaigns . . . .”). 
44 See John C. Johnson, Under New Management:  The Obligation to Protect Cultural 
Property During Military Occupation, 190/191 MIL. L. REV. 111, 114-32 (2007) (reviewing 
the history of laws and customs protecting cultural property during wartime). 
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money, treasures, and works of art.45  The first formal law concerning 
war spoils was the Roman concept of “prize law.”  Under Roman prize 
law, vanquishers were not required to return any spoils taken as a re-
sult of offensive or defensive war.46  By the Middle Ages, Christian no-
tions of ethics led to limitations on the broad allowances of prize law.  
The medieval concept of “just war” narrowed prize law so that armies 
could only keep the spoils they acquired in a defensive war.47
John Locke and other Enlightenment intellectuals questioned the 
morality of prize law in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
turies.  Locke believed that although a winner in war could take an 
enemy’s life, he should not be able take his property.48  The views of 
natural-law writers like Locke particularly influenced eighteenth-
century European politics, and warring nations began to adopt 
Locke’s views on the spoils of war.49  Even before the Second Treaty of 
Paris in 1815, a number of treaties recognized the concept of national 
property and required small-scale return of certain art objects.50
In what many scholars recognize as the first art-law case, The Mar-
quis de Somerueles, the British Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax allowed 
confiscation of spoils with an exception for art objects.51  Justice Croke 
stated that works of art are cultural property and, as such, are “an ex-
ception to the severe rights of warfare, and . . . [are] entitled to favour 
and protection.”52  Therefore, paintings and prints owned by the 
Academy of the Arts of Philadelphia that were seized by a British ship 
during the War of 1812 were returned to the museum—their rightful 
45 See Manlio Frigo, Looted Art and Public International Law:  General Principles and 
International Conventions, in 15 STUDIES IN ART LAW: CLAIMS FOR THE RESTITUTION OF 
LOOTED ART 47 (Marc-Andre Renold & Pierre Gabus eds., 2004) [hereinafter RESTI-
TUTION OF LOOTED ART] (explaining the emergence of international customs and 
conventions for returning property during and following war). 
46 See KOWALSKI, supra note 38, at 6 (noting that property became ownerless dur-
ing declared war). 
47 Id. at 6-7 (noting that wagers of unjust wars were “always burdened with the ob-
ligation of restitution”). 
48 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 389-90 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that the enemy’s property should go to his 
children). 
49 See KOWALSKI, supra note 38, at 7-8; see also Frigo, supra note 45, at 50 (stating 
that the views of natural-law writers changed ideals in the eighteenth century and be-
gan influencing peace treaties). 
50 These treaties include the Treaties of Münster (1648), Nijmegen (1678), Lun-
den (1679), Ryswick (1697), Utrecht (1713), and Whitehall (1662).  GREENFIELD, supra
note 40, at 391. 
51 The Marquis de Somerueles, [1813] Stewart’s Vice Admiralty Reports 482 (U.K.). 
52 Id. at 483. 
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owner.53  After the Second Treaty of Paris, European nations uni-
formly adopted a nationalistic view affording special protection to art 
objects.  The groundwork for the massive art-restitution campaign fol-
lowing World War II had been set, and the basic concepts governing 
art and cultural-property law shifted little between the early-
nineteenth century and the 1954 Hague Convention. 
For the last two centuries, four basic principles have governed 
when restitution is proper:  (1) nationalism, (2) legality, (3) morality, 
and (4) universalism.54  In essence, cultural-property law requires a 
court to ask four questions of a claimant.  First, how important is the 
art to the national pride of a claiming entity?55  This question reflects 
the nationalistic theories underpinning cultural-property law as ex-
pressed by Locke and embodied in the Second Treaty of Paris.  Sec-
ond, was the looting illegal when it occurred?  A court or other body 
analyzing the claim must look to past law to determine the current 
status of the stolen art even if modern law would require restitution.56
Third, what is the current prevailing public opinion about the moral-
ity of the theft?  This question can be very difficult to answer, particu-
larly when an adjudicating body must choose which ethical standard 
to apply in a heated repatriation case.57  Finally, how will returning the 
works of art affect the international art community and art scholars?  
This final question reflects the most recent theoretical addition to cul-
tural-property law—“cultural-property internationalism.”  The princi-
ple of cultural-property internationalism, or the “universal museum” 
theory, embodies the idea that art is universal, not strictly national, 
and should be preserved for educational purposes.58
53 For a helpful discussion of The Marquis de Somerueles and its ramifications for cul-
tural property law, see Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National Culture:  Recent Trends 
Toward a Liberal Exchange of Cultural Objects, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1067, 1068-69 
(2005).
54 The four-principle concept was first mentioned by art-law scholar John Henry 
Merryman.  See Merryman, supra note 43, at 10-11 (reviewing common principles from 
the literature of restitution). 
55 See Magnus Magnusson, Introduction to GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 1, 7 (not-
ing the importance of “national pride or the soothing of national injury”). 
56 See Merryman, supra note 43, at 11 (“If art looting in earlier centuries by the 
French and the Romans, among others, was legal under the then-applicable interna-
tional law, it cannot now be legally claimed that the loot they acquired and still hold 
should be legally treated as stolen property, subject to recovery by the offended state.”). 
57 Id. at 12 (citing problems, for example, in understanding the moral climate of 
eighteenth-century Athens during its occupation by the Ottoman Empire). 
58 Id.
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The question of universalism both grounds the ethical debate over 
restitution today and elicits impassioned arguments for and against 
repatriation.  Proponents of the universal-museum theory argue that 
restitution may not be appropriate if a home country or rightful 
owner would be unable to properly protect the art.59  The most vocal 
advocates of cultural-property internationalism happen to be the 
world’s “art rich” museums,60 raising the question whether the univer-
sal view is adopted out of concern for art or simple opportunism.  For 
example, a 2006 document laying out the argument for universalism 
was signed by the Getty Museum, the Guggenheim, the Louvre, the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and fourteen of the world’s other larg-
est museums.61  As a generalization, art-rich museum proponents of 
cultural-property internationalism “are against the return of anything 
if it can possibly be avoided.”62
In essence, the four questions that ground restitution claims today 
reflect the long history of looting and war.  Our concern for morality 
is rooted in Christian medieval ethics, while centuries of treaties and 
changing law have supported or forbidden looting.  Most importantly, 
adjudicators of today’s claims must balance the traditional nationalis-
tic concept of cultural property from The Marquis de Somerueles with the 
postmodern notion of universalism.  Because all of today’s restitution 
laws and customs incorporate these core principles, a successful repa-
triation claim must be strongly based in pleas to nationalism, ethics, 
law, and cultural-property internationalism. 
B. Methods of Restitution Today:  Comparative Examples 
Because of the lack of uniform private and public laws governing 
disputes over cultural property, there are no clear rules that may be 
59 See Magnusson, supra note 55, at 7 (listing as relevant considerations “the capac-
ity of the home country to house, protect, study, and display any material that is  
returned”).
60 See, e.g., James Cuno, The Object of Art Museums, in WHOSE MUSE?: ART MUSEUMS 
AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 49, 52 ( James Cuno ed., 2004) (describing the contract be-
tween the museum and the public to “acquir[e], preserv[e], and provid[e] access” to 
art); James Cuno, View from the Universal Museum [hereinafter Cuno, Universal Museum],
in IMPERIALISM, ART AND RESTITUTION, supra note 43, at 15 (arguing that museums 
hold art in trust for all mankind). 
61 Art Inst. of Chicago et al., Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal Mu-
seums, reprinted in Cuno, Universal Museum, supra note 60, at 34 app. 
62 Magnusson, supra note 55, at 7. 
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applied to these disputes.63  Post-Enlightenment restitution law and 
the notions of nationalism in the Marquis de Somerueles case seem to fa-
vor nationalistic repatriation claims as long as legality and morality are 
considered.  The universal museum model, however, has thrown a 
wrench in cultural-property law and has made claims for restitution 
extraordinarily arduous today.  A sampling of current restitution 
claims shows the delicate balance between nation-based concepts of 
cultural heritage and opposition to restitution based on cultural-
property internationalism. 
In the absence of clear legal guidelines for restitution claims, 
claimant nations have pursued a number of means and fora for the 
return of their art.  Many nations rely on traditional litigation in the 
courts of the country where the art is currently located.64  Because pri-
vate law generally favors current possessors, however, most nations 
prefer formal negotiation in heated cultural disputes.  Two examples 
of long-term negotiations—like those that might take place between 
Belgium and France65—are Greece’s failed attempts to retrieve the El-
gin Marbles from the British Museum66 and Italy’s recent success in 
reaching an agreement with the Metropolitan Museum of Art for re-
turn of the Euphronios Krater.67  Negotiation can be a better choice 
where a country does not have a strong legal claim for restitution, but 
can make a persuasive political and moral argument.68  Even the most 
persuasive ethical argument for restitution, however, must be accom-
panied by an appeal to nationalism and universalism.  The success of 
Italy’s claim stems from its careful balancing of nationalistic and uni-
versal arguments and its willingness to strike a deal with cultural-
property internationalism in mind.  The case of the Elgin Marbles, on 
63 For a discussion of the current problem, and a proposal for an international 
dispute-resolution mechanism, see Maria Granovsky, A Permanent Resolution Mechanism 
of Cultural Property Disputes, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 25 (2007). 
64 For example, Cyprus brought a recent claim in a U.S. court for the restitution of 
a mosaic from an American museum.  See Nicholas Augustinos, The Protection of Cultural 
Heritage in the Event of Armed Conflict:  The Cyprus Experience, in THE RECOVERY OF STO-
LEN ART 217, 237-39, 244-52 (Norman Palmer ed., 1998). 
65 See infra Part III. 
66 See infra Part II.B.1. 
67 See infra Part II.B.2.  Another interesting example is the dialogue between Peru 
and Yale University regarding the return of objects from Machu Picchu.  See Molly L. 
McIntosh, Note, Exploring Machu Picchu:  An Analysis of the Legal and Ethical Issues Sur-
rounding the Repatriation of Cultural Property, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 199, 201-04 
(2006).
68 McIntosh argues that one possible reason that Peru has not brought a legal ac-
tion in Connecticut courts is the relative weakness of its legal argument.  See id. at 203. 
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the other hand, illustrates the questionable reliance on universalism 
by art-rich museums to ward off restitution claims. 
1.  The Elgin Marbles and the Problem of  
Cultural-Property Internationalism 
The case of the Elgin Marbles, a particularly important contempo-
rary example, sheds light on a possible Belgian claim against France.  
In 1801, during a time of unrest in Greece, Lord Elgin removed mar-
ble statues and the frieze from the Parthenon.69  The Marbles were 
not taken by the British during war,70 but Lord Elgin used his position 
as a member of the British House of Lords to complete the opera-
tion.71  Elgin procured written authority “to remove some stones with 
inscriptions and figures”72 in the form of a letter from the Turkish 
government in Constantinople to the governor of Athens.73  Elgin 
later sold the Marbles to the British government.  The Marbles are 
now displayed in the Duveen Gallery of the British Museum.74
In 1832, Greece gained independence from Turkish rule and be-
gan to restore the Acropolis.75  At this time, Greece made its first bid 
for the return of the Elgin Marbles.76  Nevertheless, the Marbles re-
mained in the museum with little dispute over ownership until after 
World War II.77  Given the art community’s dedication to returning art 
stolen by the Nazis after the War, some British scholars and members 
of government believed that the Marbles should be given back as a 
“gesture of friendship” between Britain and Greece.78  At a 1982 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
69 GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 46. 
70 Schadla-Hall, supra note 39, at xii-xiii. 
71 See GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 55-56 (noting that Lord Elgin “used his special 
office to accomplish something which would otherwise have been impossible”). 
72 Id. at 46. 
73 See William St. Clair, Imperial Appropriations of the Parthenon, in IMPERIALISM, ART
AND RESTITUTION, supra note 43, at 65, 77-78  (noting that Lord Elgin’s firman was dif-
ferent from permissions previously granted to other applicants, and discussing the am-
biguities of its language); see also GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 53 (discussing Lord El-
gin’s application for permission to remove the Marbles). 
74 St. Clair, supra note 73, at 86-87. 
75 GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 62. 
76 See id. (noting that the recovery of the Marbles was important to Greece because 
the Parthenon is a national symbol). 
77 In 1924, Greece made its only attempt at restitution between 1832 and 1941.  Id.
78 See id. at 63 (detailing the views of British Museum administrators and Foreign 
Office employees in favor of returning the Marbles to promote positive relations be-
tween the nations). 
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(UNESCO) conference, a recommendation was made to return the 
Marbles to Greece.79  On October 12, 1983, the Greek ambassador 
made a formal request to the British Foreign Office for return of the 
Marbles.80  His restitution claim was premised on three tenants of cul-
tural-property law:  (1) the importance of the Parthenon Marbles to 
Greek cultural heritage, (2) the general rule that a work of art belongs 
in the “cultural context in which (and for which) it was created,” and 
(3) the circumstances of unrest and foreign occupation at the time 
the marbles were taken that gave the Greek people no voice in the 
original removal.81
Despite fairly strong public support for returning the Elgin Mar-
bles, the British Museum continues to firmly oppose restitution for a 
number of legal and practical reasons.  First, relying on the doctrine of 
cultural-property internationalism, the Museum has argued that re-
turning the Marbles to Greece would compromise future study and 
appreciation of the pieces.  The British also argue that as a result of 
humid weather and a poor Greek economy, the Greek government 
would be unable to preserve properly the Marbles and that the Marbles 
are best maintained in the international British Museum.82  Further-
more, because Lord Elgin received authority from the Turkish gov-
ernment to take the Marbles, the Museum also proposes that the only 
legal way to repatriate the Marbles is through an Act of Parliament.83
In all, because Greece’s arguments rest primarily on an ethical ob-
ligation to return the Marbles, negotiations between Greece and Brit-
ain have failed.  This problem is exacerbated by the new concepts of 
the universal museum and cultural-property internationalism.  In the 
absence of concrete examples describing how restitution would bene-
fit the international art community, there may be no end in sight for 
Greece. 
79 For a description of the proceedings surrounding Recommendation No. 55 in 
Mexico City, where fifty-six representatives supported return of the Marbles with no 
opposition, see Stephanie Ginger, Mercurial Melina’s Marbles, 243 CONTEMP. REV. 311, 
312 (1983). 
80 GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 67-68. 
81 See id. at 68 (analyzing Ambassador Kyriazides’s legal and political claim in the 
formal request). 
82 Cf. St. Clair, supra note 73, at 94 (describing the British ideal of a universal mu-
seum in which scholars could “compare differing styles of art”). 
83 See GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 68-71 (discussing Greece’s very limited legal 
options). 
2008] Repatriable Cultural Heritage 689
2.  The Italy-Met Accord as a Restitution Blueprint 
Another recent example of a long-term negotiation is Italy’s resti-
tution claim against the Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art for the 
Euphronios Krater and other antiquities.  This action culminated in 
the Italy-Met Accord of 2006.84  In 1972, the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art purchased the Krater, a 2500-year-old Greek bowl signed by famed 
potter and painter Euphronios.85  Almost immediately, art critics and 
historians questioned the acquisition.86  Italy contacted the United 
States Federal Bureau of Investigation and hired American lawyers to 
examine the Met’s acquisition procedures.87  Despite evidence that the 
Krater had been stolen from an Etruscan tomb outside of Rome, the 
Met maintained for thirty years that it had purchased the Krater in 
good faith.88  Although investigations led to the discovery that Ameri-
can dealer Robert Hecht sold the Krater,89 Italy was unable to connect 
Hecht to the Etruscan tomb.90  In 1995, however, Italian and Swiss in-
vestigators found a horde of stolen antiquities belonging to Giacomo 
Medici, an Italian antiquities dealer and famed museum supplier from 
whom Hecht had acquired the Krater.91  This discovery led to Medici’s 
84 See generally Aaron Kyle Briggs, Consequences of the Met-Italy Accord for the International 
Restitution of Cultural Property, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 623, 646-48 (2007) (discussing the poten-
tial of the Italy-Met Accord to change the way cultural property disputes are resolved). 
85 See James R. Mellow, A New (6th Century B.C.) Greek Vase for New York, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Nov. 12, 1972, at 42, 42-43 (discussing the desirability of the piece and its impact 
on the Met’s collection); see also Elisabetta Povoledo, Ancient Vase Comes Home to a Hero’s 
Welcome, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at B9 (describing the significance of the Krater as a 
historical artifact). 
86 See, e.g., John Canaday, Met Proud of a Rare Greek Pitcher, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
1973, at 24 (pointing to the low purchase price and lack of documentation as evidence 
of the dubious origins of the Krater). 
87 See Randy Kennedy & Hugh Eakin, The Met, Ending 30-Year Stance, Is Set to Yield 
Prized Vase to Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at A1 (detailing Italy’s legal response to the 
Met’s acquisition of the Krater). 
88 Id.
89 PETER WATSON & CECILIA TODESCHINI, THE MEDICI CONSPIRACY: THE ILLICIT
JOURNEY OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES, FROM ITALY’S TOMB RAIDERS TO THE WORLD’S GREAT-
EST MUSEUMS, at x-xii (2006) (describing the transaction between Hecht and the Met). 
90 See id. at xiv-xv (noting the New York Times’s discovery that Hecht likely pur-
chased the Krater from a tomb raider, but that he was acquitted in an early Italian trial 
because the sole witness recanted his story). 
91 See id. at 48-54 (presenting the discovery of Corridor 17—Medici’s collection of 
looted antiquities). 
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criminal conviction and Hecht’s current trial and eventually renewed 
discussions between Italy and the Met.92
While many scholars did not consider Italy’s claim for the return 
of the Euphronios Krater to be legally strong,93 renewed negotiations 
in 2005 led the Met to return the vessel to Italy.  The resulting agree-
ment, reached on February 21, 2006, reflects a careful balance of the 
four principles of restitution.94  The operative language of the Accord 
has three major parts:  (1) an acknowledgement of Italian ownership 
of the Krater, (2) an express prohibition of future litigation, and (3) a 
loan program between Italy and the Met.  The ownership provision 
meets the morality and nationalism principles for restitution.  Italy 
made a strong argument that art stolen from Italian archaeological 
sites and then illegally exported belongs to Italy and is important Ital-
ian cultural property.  As a result, the Met agreed to return the Krater 
and a number of other Italian archaeological objects in 2008.  By bar-
ring future litigation, the parties acknowledged some past illegality 
while making the agreement palatable to the Met. 
While morality, legality, and nationalism arguments are impor-
tant, the Elgin Marbles case shows that these alone will not ensure a 
successful restitution claim.  The loan program created by the Italy-
Met Accord highlights the importance of cultural-property interna-
tionalism—a crucial requirement that Greece has not addressed.  The 
Accord sets up a rotating short-term and long-term loan program 
through which Italy allows the Met to borrow archeological objects for 
study and display.  By accepting this provision, Italy acknowledged the 
importance of public education and cooperation in the universal-
museum model.  The Accord’s inclusion of universal-museum values 
was fundamentally important to Philippe de Montebello, the director 
of the Met, who asserted that the agreement would “pave the road to 
new legal and ethical norms in the future” while “not depriv[ing] the 
92 See Hugh Eakin & Elisabetta Povoledo, Met’s Fears on Looted Antiquities Are Not 
New, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at E1 (revealing that the Met had seriously considered 
returning the Krater as early as 2003 after renewed talks in the wake of evidence 
amassed for Medici and Hecht’s trials). 
93 Under American law, Italy would have to argue that the Met knowingly pur-
chased stolen antiquities—a difficult burden to meet given these circumstances.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 411 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting the Na-
tional Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006)); United States v. McClain, 545 
F.2d 988, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1977) (same). 
94 Agreement Between The Ministry of Cultural Assets and Activities of the Italian 
Republic and The Metropolitan Museum of Art (Feb. 21, 2006), reprinted in 13 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 427 (2006).
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millions of visitors to our museum of the opportunity to see archaeo-
logical material.”95  Recognizing that it was dealing with the Met, an 
art-rich museum and one of the proponents of the universal museum 
ideal, Italy wisely accepted the loan concession as crucial to the suc-
cess of its restitution claim. 
In his article examining the Italy-Met Accord, Aaron Kyle Briggs 
notes that the Accord has set new standards in nations’ abilities to 
make ethical and political claims against foreign museums without 
pursuing litigation.96  Briggs points to the bargaining-power/liability-
waiver model that is Italy’s main asset in its restitution claim: 
Italy achieves considerable bargaining power by making clear it will re-
fuse to lend art and antiquities to uncooperative museums for temporary 
exhibitions.  Amidst this dual pressure, Italy then offers museums a way 
out by waiving all liability . . . , which is good for museum public rela-
tions . . . in exchange for what Italy desired:  restitution and ownership 
transfer of the cultural property.
97
Briggs, however, is not optimistic that this model can easily be repli-
cated in other restitution cases because of the unique circumstances 
surrounding the Italy-Met Accord.98
Repatriation claims, like those brought by Italy and Greece, are 
largely handled on an ad hoc basis that relies on local law, diplomacy, 
and legal theory.  If a nation has a strong legal argument for restitu-
tion, then it will likely succeed on the merits in court or through in-
formal negotiation.  However, as demonstrated by the disparate ex-
periences of Greece with the Elgin Marbles and Italy with the 
Euphronios Krater, claims resting on nationalistic or ethical duties 
alone rarely succeed.  In an art world increasingly concerned with 
public education and international cooperation, an appeal to cultural-
property internationalism is the key factor distinguishing successful 
from unsuccessful restitution. 
95 Elisabetta Povoledo, Italy and U.S. Sign Antiquities Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
2006, at E7. 
96 See Briggs, supra note 84, at 652-53 (suggesting that the Accord may open new 
avenues for dialogue about art and ownership). 
97 Id. at 642-43. 
98 See id. at 652-53.  I will argue in Part III.D that Briggs makes this conclusion too 
hastily and that Belgium and other claimant countries have much to learn from the 
Italy-Met Accord. 
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III. RESTITUTION OF FLEMISH ART AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
Whether Belgium has a legal claim for possession of paintings sto-
len by French armies and placed in French museums almost two cen-
turies ago depends on Belgium’s ability to make a convincing restitu-
tion argument based on the four principles of legality, morality, 
nationalism, and universalism.  Key to a successful claim is whether 
Belgium can show that repatriation is best for public education and 
cultural-property internationalism.  A convincing argument for resti-
tution, however, does not alone create ownership rights for Belgium.  
It must also overcome a host of jurisdictional and other legal hurdles 
implicit in multinational legal conflicts.  Seemingly simple issues, such 
as where to bring a lawsuit or which nation’s law to apply, become sig-
nificant problems in restitution claims.  The hypothetical case be-
tween Belgium and France shows that jurisdictional dilemmas can 
thwart strong repatriation claims. 
This final Part analyzes the strength of Belgium’s possible restitu-
tion claim by first examining the arguments for and against returning 
Flemish Art.  Parts III.B and III.C then consider the legal routes for 
restitution—both in French courts under French law and in interna-
tional adjudicatory bodies.  Finally, Part III.D examines formal and in-
formal negotiation as a possible route for restitution and argues that 
the methods of negotiation in the Italy-Met Accord should be stan-
dardized in order to close the illogical gaps in cultural-property law. 
A.  Why Should France Return Flemish Art Now? 
As seen in the failed Elgin Marbles claim and the successful Italy-
Met Accord, the four basic principles of cultural-property law must be 
present in a convincing restitution claim.  Although nationalism, mo-
rality, and legality are important considerations, an explanation of 
how restitution works within the universal-museum model is central to 
success.99
1.  Nationalism 
In order to warrant protection under the special rules for cultural 
property, the Flemish paintings in the Louvre and regional museums 
must have been and continue to be important to Belgium’s cultural 
99 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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identity.  There is no controlling definition of cultural heritage and 
property; however, international and local law provides some instruc-
tive guidance.  Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property defines cultural property 
as “property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically des-
ignated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehis-
tory, history, literature, art, or science.”100  Furthermore, French ex-
port law labels “[o]bjects of national importance for historical or 
artistic reasons” protected cultural property.101
Importantly, the Second Treaty of Paris and accompanying corre-
spondences identified Flemish art as Belgium’s cultural property at 
the time it was taken by Napoleon’s forces.  The Treaty justified resti-
tution because of the importance of art to each nation.102  Because the 
Treaty and its signatories identified the stolen works of art as impor-
tant to Belgian cultural identity, the art likely falls under the extraor-
dinarily broad definitions of artistic cultural property in the UNESCO 
Convention and in French law. 
2.  Morality and Legality 
While Belgium can strongly argue that France has a moral obliga-
tion to return the art, the existence of a legal obligation is unclear.  
Claimants can almost always make a moral or ethical argument for 
restitution when art was stolen during war or unrest.  Belgium here 
need only note how Napoleon preyed on its relative weakness at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century and how France’s armies forcibly 
removed art from Belgian churches, museums, and homes. 
Particularly when art was stolen centuries ago, however, claims are 
not always based in law.103  It is not settled whether France actually vio-
lated international law when its troops took art from Belgian churches 
and galleries.  During the eighteenth century, art law evolved a great 
deal, from prize law to the current concept of cultural property.  Art-
law scholar John Henry Merryman argues that the common law before 
100 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 
823 U.N.T.S. 231, 233 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]. 
101 GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 113 (quoting the Law of June 23, 1941 (Fr.)). 
102 See KOWALSKI, supra note 38, at 22-23 (linking the rise of national consciousness 
to the arguments advanced in favor of restitution). 
103 See supra Part II.B (discussing Italian, Peruvian, and Greek claims for restitution). 
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1815 did not completely prevent armies from keeping spoils of war 
because prize law still applied.104  The first Belgian paintings, however, 
were taken in 1794—decades after many other European treaties re-
quired restitution of stolen art.105  Nevertheless, even if the thefts were 
not illegal at the time they occurred, the Second Treaty of Paris pres-
sured France to return stolen art.  Because Belgium can point to a spe-
cific treaty requiring restitution of its art, its restitution claim is much 
stronger than one resting on ethics alone. 
3.  Universalism 
As with other contemporary restitution claims, the fourth cultural-
property principle—universalism—creates a significant roadblock for 
Belgium.  Some French writers believed that the 1815 restitution of art 
to other European countries unfairly and unethically hindered public 
appreciation of art.106  As an art-rich participant in the 2006 Declara-
tion describing the importance of the universal museum,107 the Louvre 
would undoubtedly base its opposition to restitution on the concept 
of cultural-property internationalism.  The Louvre has innumerable 
resources to preserve and protect Flemish art for the public at large.  
Particularly in the wake of the 2006 Italy-Met Accord,108 however, it is 
undecided whether universalism makes museums owners of world 
heritage or simply stewards of it, subject to restitution in certain cir-
cumstances.109  Because Belgium has a stable economy and numerous 
world-class museums that could properly preserve returned artwork, it 
has a better restitution claim than Greece did for restitution of the El-
104 See Merryman, supra note 43, at 6 (stating that appropriating art as a spoil of 
war did not violate international law at the time). 
105 See generally Frigo, supra note 45, at 50-51 (describing legal arrangements in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). 
106 See, e.g., Eugène Müntz, Les invasions de 1814–1815 et la spoliation de nos musées
(pt. 2), LA NOUVELLE REVUE, July, 1897, at 201-02 (decrying the limited return of some 
art to the Netherlands as unnecessary); see also id. (pt. 1), LA NOUVELLE REVUE, April, 
1897 (criticizing the Allies for requesting return of art from the Louvre where it could 
have been appreciated by more members of the public); id. (pt. 3), LA NOUVELLE RE-
VUE, August, 1897 (same). 
107 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
108 The Met also signed the 2006 declaration exalting the universal museum.  See
Art Inst. of Chicago et al., supra note 61. 
109 See Briggs, supra note 84, at 652-53 (suggesting that recent “dialogue between 
source nations and museums” may lead to museums acting primarily as “stewards of 
cultural property”). 
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gin Marbles.110  As long as Belgium is willing to make concessions—
like the loan agreement in the Italy-Met Accord—or otherwise show its 
devotion to public education and study of the arts, it would likely 
overcome the problem of cultural-property internationalism. 
As a competent steward of important cultural objects and the 
rightful owner of many Flemish works remaining in French museums 
after the Second Treaty of Paris, Belgium would fulfill the four princi-
ples of cultural-property restitution.  Unlike Greece, Belgium is a 
country well situated to show how restitution could benefit the art 
world.  If Belgium can find an appropriate forum for its claim, it can 
make a strong case for restitution. 
B. Possible Solutions in Private International Law 
Even though the principles underlying cultural-property law ar-
guably favor restitution, Belgium must find an appropriate forum to 
adjudicate its claim.  Informal negotiation with individual museums is 
an option, but the result of negotiation is highly uncertain.111  An al-
ternative is to bring a case in French courts under French private law. 
Kurt Siehr presents three problems associated with the use of re-
covery proceedings under private international law:  (1) jurisdiction,112
(2) statutes of limitations,113 and (3) title acquired by limitation or loot-
ing.114  Belgium is not barred from bringing a case for lack of jurisdic-
tion.  French troops stole Flemish art, and because the art remains in 
French museums today, French courts have jurisdiction over a repa-
triation claim.  However, French property law creates a number of 
challenges with regard to the applicable statute of limitations and title. 
First, the general statute of limitations in France requires a plain-
tiff to bring a case to reclaim an object from a possessor who acquired 
110 See id. at 646 (claiming that an important factor supporting Britain’s universal-
ist argument in the Elgin Marbles controversy is that Greece does not have the re-
sources to protect the Marbles if returned). 
111 See supra Part II.B. 
112 Kurt Siehr, Restitution of Looted Art in Private International Law, in RESTITUTION 
OF LOOTED ART, supra note 45, at 71, 80  (discussing how a host state’s legal system can 
make recovery difficult by creating immunity for museums). 
113 Id. at 86-88 (citing art-recovery cases under New York and German law where 
the statutes of limitations did not bar the recovery claims, and a Dutch recovery case 
where the statute of limitations did bar the claim). 
114 Id. at 81-83 (explaining that, while looting no longer creates title in an object, 
other legal limitations—such as statutes of limitations or the particular classification 
given to recovery actions for stolen art—can bar recovery claims). 
696 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 673
it in good faith within three years from the date of the loss or theft.115
When there is an absence of good faith, the limitations period is 
lengthened to thirty years.116  Even though the Flemish art was taken 
by force and in bad faith, the longer thirty-year statute would still bar a 
claim for art taken almost two centuries ago. 
A potential loophole exists in French property law, however, 
which might allow a longer statutory period.  When the Louvre and 
certain other museums and libraries were declared national property 
in 1848, French case law began to recognize a special category of 
“classified chattels,” including artwork in state and local public muse-
ums.117  French courts established a rule of lenience with regard to 
state claims for artwork stolen from these museums.  For example, in 
Bibliothèque Royale c. Charron,118 a court allowed a public library to re-
cover an important manuscript after the statute of limitations had run.  
More dramatically, in Bonnin c. Villes de Mâcon et de Lyon,119 a city mu-
seum succeeded in its restitution claim to recover a medieval manu-
script forty-three years after the manuscript was stolen.  The Law on 
Historic Monuments of December 31, 1913, codified the precedent in 
Bibliothèque Royale and Bonnin by granting the Fine Arts Minister an 
unlimited amount of time to bring an action for stolen goods.120  Al-
though this rule seems to be promising for Belgium’s claim, no case 
has allowed parties other than the French Minister of Culture and 
Communication to make use of the unlimited statute of limitations.  
Nonetheless, Belgium might be able to rely on the special categoriza-
tion of artwork as “classified chattels” under French law to get around 
the otherwise strict thirty-year deadline. 
115 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2279 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE 418 
( John H. Crabb trans., rev. ed. 1995). 
116 Id. art. 2262 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, supra note 115, at 416 
(“All actions, [in rem] as well as [in personam], are pr[o]scribed by thirty years, with-
out the one who alleges such pr[o]scription being obliged to show a right thereto, or 
an inferred objection of bad faith being able to be raised against him.”). 
117 See Ruth Redmond-Cooper, Limitation of Actions, in ART LOANS 343, 360-62 
(Norman Palmer ed., 1997). 
118 Cours Royales [Royal Court] Paris, Jan. 3, 1846, D.P. II 1846, 2e civ. 212, 213 
(allowing recovery after eight years despite the general three-year statute of limitations 
at the time). 
119 Cass. req. [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] Paris, June 17, 1896, D.P. I 
1897, 1e civ. 257. 
120 See Law on Historic Monuments of Dec. 31, 1913, art. 20, D.P. IV 1915, 153, 
157; see also Ruth Redmond-Cooper, Time Limits in Actions to Recover Stolen Art, in THE
RECOVERY OF STOLEN ART supra note 64, at 153 (noting that works of art frequently 
remain recoverable for longer periods of time than other stolen items). 
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Even if Belgium were able to skirt the French statute of limita-
tions, the Law on Historic Monuments, and the French Export Law of 
June 23, 1941, prevent public museums from disposing of art, particu-
larly works made before 1900.121  This means that French courts would 
likely bar restitution because French law prohibits transferring owner-
ship of art belonging to the state.  For example, when Greece made a 
restitution claim for the Venus de Milo (located in the Louvre), 
France asserted that French law prevented the return even if there was 
“a wish to do so; these treasures belonged to the French nation.”122
This precedent, however, does not engender title by looting.  The 
Venus de Milo was legally purchased by a French ambassador in Con-
stantinople in 1821.  The Flemish art, on the other hand, was forcibly 
taken, and France essentially violated the spirit of the Second Treaty 
of Paris by not returning it.  With regard to stolen or illicitly traded 
items located in the Louvre and other museums, French courts have 
been more lenient.  In 1950, France returned Laotian artwork taken 
during the colonial invasion of Laos.123  In 1981, a French court or-
dered restitution of an illicitly traded Amon Min statue to Egypt.124
Additionally, in 1980, France agreed to a long-term loan agreement 
with the Iraq Museum for fragments of the Babylonian law codes.125
Still, each of these restitutions involved return of art to non-Western 
countries.  European countries generally are more willing to repatri-
ate art to former colonies in Africa and Asia than to exchange art with 
other European nations.  This is particularly true for exchanges be-
tween members of the European Union.  In many cases, the universal-
museum concept disfavors transfers among European countries, as 
these nations increasingly view themselves more as members of the 
greater Union than as individual nation states.126
Overall, even though French courts would have jurisdiction, Bel-
gium must cross too many hurdles for successful restitution under pri-
vate law.  Not only does the generally applicable statute of limitations 
121 GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 113 (quoting the export-law provision requiring 
authorization from the Secretary of State for Education and Youth for export of in-
cluded works). 
122 Id. at 111. 
123 Magnusson, supra note 55, at 4. 
124 See GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 374; Magnusson, supra note 55, at 5. 
125 Magnusson, supra note 55, at 5. 
126 See GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 114-15 (“[T]he collective European position 
can be seen to run counter to the idea of national cultural protection, and to positively 
impede the concept of cultural return within Europe.”); cf., e.g., Schadla-Hall, supra
note 39, at ix n.2 (noting Italy’s return of a fourth-century obelisk to Ethiopia). 
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bar Belgium’s claim at this point, but also France’s unique legal struc-
ture may prevent the Louvre and other museums from handing over 
artwork even when statutes of limitations do not.  While France more 
readily accepts restitution to “non-Western” or “non-European” coun-
tries, it is less likely to decide a restitution claim in favor of another 
European Union member. 
C. Possible Solutions in Public International Law 
The clear benefit of public international law over private law is 
consistency.  A problem with private international cultural-property 
law in general is the degree of legal variance between countries.  Pos-
sible solutions in private law, therefore, depend not only on the merits 
of a claimant’s case, but also on the jurisdictional laws and statutes of 
limitations of particular countries.  In order to circumvent the incon-
sistencies of private law, many claimant countries turn to public inter-
national law as an alternative. 
Following the growing popularity of cultural-property internation-
alism and the campaign to return stolen Nazi art, a number of inter-
national conventions laid out rules for restitution in public interna-
tional law.127  Because public international law is based on the 
common law of cultural property, Belgium would have a high likeli-
hood of success on the merits should it rely on public law.  Nonethe-
less, because France has not ratified several major international con-
ventions, Belgium may face a jurisdictional problem in finding an 
appropriate forum to hear a restitution claim. 
International cultural-property law emerged at the end of the 
French Revolution.  Since the Congress of Vienna and the Second 
Treaty of Paris in 1815, two bodies of international cultural-property 
rules have emerged.  The first set of principles requires nations to 
avoid destroying cultural property in occupied countries, while the 
second concerns the obligation to return looted cultural property.128
127 For a good general overview of public international cultural-property law, see 
Patty Gerstenblith & Lucille Roussin, International Cultural Property, 41 INT’L LAW. 613 
(2007).
128 Frigo, supra note 45, at 48-49 (describing the evolution of these bodies of law 
and finding that the obligation to return has been much more controversial than the 
rule to avoid destruction); see also supra Part II.A. 
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Common international law also has no statute of limitations for any 
claim.129
Two conventions grew out of common cultural-property law fol-
lowing World War II:  the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention.  The UNESCO Convention is the primary 
source of international law governing cultural property today and has 
been ratified by most, but not all, nations.130  The Convention broadly 
requires restitution of stolen and illicitly traded art, and, because it 
has no rules about time limitations,131 would be an excellent basis for a 
Belgian claim.  A key problem with the UNESCO Convention, how-
ever, is the absence of art-rich nations, including France, as member 
states.132  Because France is not a member state, Belgium cannot claim 
that France has any obligation under the UNESCO Convention. 
France was, however, a signatory of the 1995 UNIDROIT Conven-
tion on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cul-
tural Objects.133  UNIDROIT and UNESCO provide similar protec-
tions for illicitly traded cultural property, but UNIDROIT is silent with 
regard to wartime seizures.  As a result of this silence, many scholars 
feel that UNIDROIT is a watered-down law favoring art-rich coun-
129 GREENFIELD, supra note 40, at 82 (concluding that “national legislation cannot 
prescribe any rights in international law and could not have any effect on any interna-
tional historic delict”). 
130 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 100. 
131 Cf. JIRÍ TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 345 (1996) (arguing that there is no statute of limitations for claims 
related to the return of cultural property under the UNESCO Convention). 
132 The lack of key parties is a problem plaguing international cultural-property 
conventions.  See Norman Palmer, Statutory, Forensic and Ethical Initiatives in the Recovery of 
Stolen Art and Antiquities, in THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN ART, supra note 64, at 1, 20 (not-
ing that the United Kingdom, along with several other important nations, has not rati-
fied the 1970 UNESCO Convention); Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cul-
tural Property:  Some Skeptical Observations, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 219 (2007) (noting that 
many treaties suffer from both insufficient adoption and insufficient enforcement). 
133 June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].  For a good 
comparison of the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions, see Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO 
and UNIDROIT:  A Partnership Against Trafficking in Cultural Objects, in THE RECOVERY OF 
STOLEN ART, supra note 64, at 205.  Even though France was a signatory of the 
UNIDROIT Convention, most “market countries” have not signed the Convention, se-
verely limiting a claimant country’s use of the Convention.  See Stacey Falkoff, Mutually-
Beneficial Repatriation Agreements:  Returning Cultural Patrimony, Perpetuating the Illicit Antiq-
uities Market, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 265, 299-304 (2007) (describing the many problems claimant 
countries face under UNIDROIT, including vague language and the absence of many 
market countries as signatories); Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts 
Involving Stolen Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1177, 1186-87 (2005). 
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tries.134  Additionally, the UNIDROIT Convention includes a statute of 
limitations barring claims brought more than three years after the 
time of discovery with a “longstop” provision of fifty years.135  If a cul-
tural object is particularly important to the cultural identity of the 
possessing country, even this “longstop” rule is subject to a three-year 
limitation period running from the date of discovery of the location 
and identity of the possessor.136  Even though the UNIDROIT statute 
of limitations alone presents an obvious problem for Belgium, the in-
surmountable hurdle involved in using public international law is that 
both the UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions are not retroactive.  
No express provision of either Convention denies retroactivity, but the 
standard rule of international law is that treaties are not retroactive 
and that an explicit provision saying so is not required.137
Ultimately, if Belgium were to bring a claim relying on public in-
ternational law, it would have to base its case on common law rather 
than any particular convention.  This creates additional jurisdictional 
problems because, while conventions might designate an appropriate 
forum, there is no universally suitable public international legal forum 
to adjudicate Belgium’s case.  This leaves Belgium with little forum 
choice.  One option is the Council of Europe, which can adjudicate 
claims brought by member states such as Belgium and France.  The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, however, issued a 
1983 resolution and report on the return of works of art that declared 
that “claims for the return of cultural property within the European 
area must be considered differently from claims for return of property 
outside this area.”138  This rule would bar a claim for cultural property 
brought by one member state against another.  The other potential 
forum is the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has jurisdic-
tion over contentious cases between U.N. member nations as long as 
134 See, e.g., Kirstin E. Petersen, Note, Cultural Apocalypse Now:  The Loss of the Iraq 
Museum and a New Proposal for the Wartime Protection of Museums, 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 163, 
178 (2007) (noting that UNIDROIT does not provide for the return of wartime sei-
zures and thus provides no solution to art stolen from the Iraq Museum in 2003). 
135 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 133, art. 3.  The application of the “long-
stop” provision does not take into account when the art object was discovered, but 
places a maximum fifty year limit on action from the time of the theft itself. 
136 See Redmond-Cooper, supra note 117, at 153-54 (discussing the different time 
limitations in the UNIDROIT Convention); see also Prott, supra note 133, at 211 (not-
ing that a number of states with an important trade in cultural objects supported time 
limitations on claims in the UNIDROIT Convention). 
137 See Prott, supra note 133, at 213. 
138 Eur. Parl. Ass., Resolution on the Return of Works of Art, 35th Sess., Res. No. 808 
(1983); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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both nations “refer” the case to the ICJ.139  France would therefore 
have to consent to the hearing based on international common law.  
Additionally, because judgments of the ICJ are not binding, any deci-
sion in Belgium’s favor would not mandate restitution.140
In all, because France has not signed the 1970 UNESCO Conven-
tion and because the UNIDROIT Convention provides no relief for 
nations attempting to recover art stolen during wartime, Belgium’s 
claim would fail under both private and public international law.  Al-
though today’s legal regimes provide solace for countries whose cul-
tural property was stolen after World War II, nations with longstand-
ing claims are left helpless under the current state of the law.  The 
situation suggests an immense gap in cultural-property law:  the legal 
status of art stolen in wars before the twentieth century. 
D.  The Italy-Met Accord as a Model for Formal Negotiation 
Despite a strong argument for restitution, no legal forum in pub-
lic or private international law exists in which Belgium can bring a 
claim against France.  The current legal framework essentially protects 
nations that hold art stolen before the twentieth century.  Barring le-
gal claims brought by nations whose artwork and cultural heritage lie 
in the museum of another country merely because of a flaw in cul-
tural-property law is not a satisfactory result. 
While informal negotiation can lead to successful restitution in 
the absence of litigation, negotiation also produces widely divergent 
results, as discussed in Part II.B.  Many art museums simply invoke the 
notion of cultural-property internationalism in order to keep impor-
139 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1), June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 156 U.N.T.S. 77. (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which 
the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the 
United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”). 
140 A peculiar option that other nations have followed is to rely on the United States 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006), which gives United 
States courts jurisdiction over international disputes involving any works of art that had 
ever been loaned to or present in an American museum.  See, e.g., Sylvia Hochfield, Who 
Owns the Stedelijk’s Maleviches?, ARTNEWS, Apr. 2004, at 64, 64-65 (discussing a suit against 
an Amsterdam museum under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that was brought 
when the museum lent the paintings in dispute to an American museum).  While such a 
suit is not currently an option for Belgium, if the Louvre or another French museum ever 
loans one of the Flemish paintings to an American museum, Belgium would have a 
claim.  This might not be a distant hypothetical given the current loan agreement be-
tween the Louvre and the High Museum of Art in Atlanta, Georgia.  See Alan Riding, 
France Frets as Louvre Looks Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at E1. 
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tant pieces on their walls, despite the claimant country’s best moral, 
legal, and nationalistic arguments for restitution.  Informal negotia-
tion is far too malleable a process to provide consistent protection for 
countries with legitimate restitution claims.  One apparent solution is 
formalized negotiation procedures.  Fortunately, the Italy-Met Accord 
provides duplicable guidelines for standardized negotiation that 
would fill the gap in cultural-property law and provide Belgium with a 
desirable outcome. 
Aaron Kyle Briggs has noted that the Italy-Met Accord is particu-
larly instructive because it provides the themes for successful restitu-
tion dialogue.  He has described how Italy was able to construct a bar-
gaining-power/liability-waiver model to practically bribe the Met into 
returning the Euphronios Krater.141  In order for this bargaining-
power/liability-waiver model to be successful, Briggs points to six cir-
cumstantial requirements:  (1) the art in question is important to the 
possessing museum’s collection; (2) the museum cannot afford 
lengthy litigation; (3) the claimant is an art-rich nation and there is 
high demand for the claimant’s cultural property; (4) the claimant is 
able to properly preserve cultural property if restituted; (5) the coun-
try in which the possessing museum is located must be a party to an 
international agreement encouraging return of looted art; and (6) the 
claimant has evidence of illegality in the acquisition process.142  Al-
though Briggs concedes that the cooperative themes of the Accord are 
important to future restitution claims, he argues that because of the 
numerous incidental requirements for success in the bargaining-
power/liability-waiver model, the Accord cannot be easily replicated 
in all other situations. 
Although Briggs came to the important conclusion that the Italy-
Met Accord provides themes for restitution dialogue, he too quickly 
dismissed the Accord as a potentially unreplicable model for formal 
negotiation.  What is important about the Italy-Met Accord is not sim-
ply the bargaining-power/liability-waiver model, as Briggs notes, but 
the inclusion of universal museum concepts in the form of the loan 
agreement.  Italy’s agreement to provide a series of short-term loans 
in return for acknowledgement of Italian ownership of the Eu-
phronios Krater sensibly solves the universalism problem encountered 
141 See Briggs, supra note 84, at 642-43 (discussing how Italy established bargaining 
power with the Met by threatening to withhold future loans of Italian antiquities and 
offering to waive its right to future litigation if the Met returned the Krater); see also
supra Part II.B. 
142 See Briggs, supra note 84, at 643-48. 
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by many claimant countries.  As long as the claiming country is able to 
properly preserve returned artwork, loan agreements fill any void in 
the public’s ability to study the art of other cultures.  Where coopera-
tive exchanges of art maintain the universal-museum model, strategic 
reliance on cultural-property internationalism to rebut restitution 
claims is minimized. 
When the Italy-Met Accord is viewed as the successful culmination 
of the four principles of cultural property, the Accord’s processes and 
conclusions are replicable on a much larger scale.  A standardized ne-
gotiation model based on the Italy-Met Accord could have four steps: 
(1) an initial opportunity for the claiming country to present evi-
dence that artwork was illegally and immorally taken from its borders 
and that, if restituted, the claimant could properly preserve the art-
work;
(2) a chance for the possessing museum or country to offer proof 
of its good faith acquisition in order to prevent outright restitution; 
(3) a mandated short-term loan series in situations where the pos-
sessing party acquired the artwork in good faith or where cultural-
property law does not provide a clear remedy (the series would re-
quire the claimant to provide short-term loans of comparable artwork 
in exchange for returning the artwork in question and acknowledging 
the claimant’s ownership); and finally, 
(4) a waiver of liability and an agreement not to pursue future le-
gal recourse against the possessing museum or country. 
This suggested plan requires the claimant to meet the four re-
quirements for restitution and specifically benefits the public by call-
ing for cooperation and exchange between museums.  Furthermore, 
by requiring loans, the plan diminishes the possibility of frivolous res-
titution claims.  Countries hoping for the return of their artwork must 
be willing to cooperate and even lend comparable art to possessing 
museums.  Because of this requirement, a claimant has an incentive to 
bring a claim only for truly important cultural property.  The model 
can be copied in a variety of circumstances and would allow the par-
ties to come to a specific agreement on how best to restitute art. 
Belgium would clearly benefit from standardized negotiations fol-
lowing the model of the Italy-Met Accord.  Because Belgium can pre-
sent a strong legal argument for restitution based on the Second 
Treaty of Paris, it would be able to meet the first step.  Additionally, 
Belgium, like Italy, is a cultural patron of some of the world’s finest 
artwork and is situated to preserve any artwork that is restituted.  Even 
if France is not willing to concede that it holds the artwork in bad 
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faith, Belgium and France could agree to a loan program in exchange 
for recognizing Belgian ownership of the art.  Because Belgian muse-
ums hold many great works of art, a series of short-term loans in ex-
change for restitution would benefit both Belgium and the museums 
returning the stolen art.  One potential difficulty in this proposal is 
that Belgium would negotiate with individual French museums, rather 
than engage in nation-to-nation dialogue.  While this minor complex-
ity might create some practical difficulties, the potential end result 
would likely be the same. 
The greatest setback for standardizing negotiation procedures is 
the need for an adjudicatory body to convince museums to follow a 
new standard.  Fortunately, most of the world’s museums are mem-
bers of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and therefore 
must adhere to the baseline ethical standards set forth in ICOM’s 
Code of Ethics.  Currently, ICOM requirements for repatriation 
claims are very relaxed.  ICOM members must simply submit to dia-
logue with nations attempting to repatriate cultural property.143
ICOM provides an acceptable infrastructure for standardized negotia-
tion procedures.  Nevertheless, the museum members of ICOM would 
have to agree to the negotiation plan. 
The 2006 Italy-Met Accord auspiciously provides the groundwork 
for a broadly reproducible standard negotiation procedure that en-
compasses the four principles at the core of cultural-property law.  
Formalized negotiation as an industry standard would represent an 
admirable step by museums themselves to fill the gaps left open by 
lawmakers. 
CONCLUSION
Because of war, revolution, and colonialism, much of the stolen 
art currently held in European museums was taken from its respective 
country of origin before the twentieth century, yet contemporary legal 
regimes provide little consolation for countries attempting to repos-
sess art looted before World War II.  In many instances, private and 
143 INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, ICOM CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS, 2006 art. 
6.2 (2006), available at http://icom.museum/ethics.html (“Museums should be pre-
pared to initiate dialogues for the return of cultural property to a country or people of 
origin.  This should be undertaken in an impartial manner, based on scientific, profes-
sional and humanitarian principles as well as applicable local, national and interna-
tional legislation . . . .”); see also id. art. 6.1 (“The possibility of developing partnerships 
with museums in countries or areas that have lost a significant part of their heritage 
should be explored.”). 
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public laws based on cultural-property internationalism simply sanc-
tion past wrongs.  Belgium’s case is important for considering the 
status of art stolen as a spoil of war and for the significance of includ-
ing repatriation clauses in peace treaties.  Even though France clearly 
disregarded the restitution provisions of the Second Treaty of Paris, 
Belgium has no legal recourse in private or public international law.  
The only currently available vehicle for a potential Belgian restitution 
claim is informal negotiation, relying on France’s moral obligation to 
return artwork stolen by Napoleon.  The limits of the UNESCO and 
UNIDROIT Conventions, as well as the fact that private law makes res-
titution claims difficult among European countries, create a poten-
tially devastating situation for nations hoping for the return of their 
cultural property. 
Although the universal-museum model unquestionably benefits 
academics, art should also be valued for its role in defining individual 
cultures and nations.  Before cultural-property internationalism advo-
cates further weaken nation-based restitution laws, art and cultural-
heritage lawyers must consider the ramifications of the universal-
museum concept.  If we proceed under the current model, art-rich 
museums in powerful countries will be able to keep cultural-property 
objects as a matter of course. 
The Italy-Met Accord reflects an encouraging shift in at least one 
museum’s approach to a restitution claim.  Although initially con-
strued as a unique agreement based on particularized circumstances, 
the Accord provides an ideal and replicable framework for future res-
titution claims.  Because the Accord is based on the four longstanding 
principles of cultural property—morality, legality, nationalism, and 
universalism—it has the potential to function as a standardized nego-
tiation procedure for future restitution claims.  The restitution of the 
Euphronios Krater to Italy heralded a new era in art law and finally 
struck an appropriate balance between nationalism and cultural-
property internationalism. 
If museums are willing to standardize restitution procedures, they 
may be able to correct the defects in private and public cultural-
property law that bar many valid restitution claims.  In the absence of 
a clear legal solution to pre–twentieth century restitution claims such 
as Belgium’s, museums are best situated to solve the problem in fur-
therance of their role as stewards of the world’s cultural property. 
